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Commit 3b4929f6 authored by Eric Dumazet's avatar Eric Dumazet Committed by David S. Miller
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tcp: limit payload size of sacked skbs



Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash
in tcp_shifted_skb() :

	BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount);

This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest
MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48

An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB
on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC.

This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
can overflow.

Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB
of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled.
SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit
queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity.

CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs

Fixes: 832d11c5 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing")
Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: default avatarJonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: default avatarNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
parent 1eb4169c
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